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Article
Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory*
Carrie Menkel-Meadow**
Does feminism have a theory? If so, what is it?
Does feminism have a method? If so, what is it?
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FEMINIST MOVES N LAW
In the beginning, law was male.' Law was made by men,2
though it was enforced against women as well as men and it was
practiced only by men until relatively recently in human history
* The Pacific Law Journal is published in conformity with a modified version of the
HARVARD BLUE BOOK (14th ed. 1986). For ideological reasons, the author prefers not to comply with
this form of citation of authority. The Pacific LawJournal respects the author's beliefs and feels that
this article is worthy of publication in its present form, thus the normal rules governing citation
format have been waived. - Board of Editors
** Professor of Law, UCLA. A.B. Barnard College; J.D. University of Pennsylvania. This
article is based on a lecture delivered at McGeorge Law School on April 9, 1992. Thanks to Carmel
Sella for research assistance, good conversations and reminders to pay attention to what is real and
what is important. Thanks also to three people I have never met who have put together one of the
best bibliographies on feminist legal theory that currently exists. Though it is not totally up to date,
and consigned to being outdated the minute it was published, given the vast outpouring of feminist
scholarship, this volume will be of immense use to researchers and writers on feminist legal issues
for many years. Thanks to F.C. DeCoste, K.M. Munro and Lillian MacPherson for FEMNsT LEGAL
LrTERATuRE: A SELEcTivE ANNOTATED BmuoRGPHY (Garland Publishing, 1991). Finally, thanks
as always, to my most incisive, but supportive critic, Robert Meadow.
1. See generally Rifin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARVARD WOMEN'S
Li. 83 (1980); TAUB & SCHNEIDER, WOMEN'S SUBORDINAnON AND T-e RurLE OF LAw, THE
PoLmcs OF LAW D. Kairys, ed, 2nd ed. 1990; Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in
the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MiAMI L. RV. 29 (1987).
2. See generally Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NonRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989) (arguing that law's language is
male and therefore excludes women's experience).
3. MENKEL-MEADow, lE FEMINIZAION OF TIE LEGAL PROFESsION: TmE COMPARATIVE
SOCIOLOGY OF WOMEN IN TnE LEaAL PROFESSION, LAWYERS AND SOCIETY, VOL III COMPARATIVE
TEORms (Abel & Lewis eds., 1990).
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In the late 1960s, what we now call "the second wave of
feminism" 4 spirited an interest in how law could help achieve
equality for women, through legal rights, as well as a less
optimistic analysis that law was also responsible for, or at least
played a role in, women's subordination. Women went to law
school hoping to contribute legal activism to the larger political
struggles for "women's rights" which grew out of the other social
movements of the day, namely civil rights and anti-war activism.
5
In their efforts to study and use law to improve women's material,
political and psychological conditions, feminist lawyers confronted
male-made legal doctrine.
This Article reviews the history of feminist "confrontation"
with law, from the earliest strategies of using and adapting
preexisting legal categories to the more complex interrogations of
law currently being made by feminists under the rubric of feminist
jurisprudence or feminist legal theory.6 Several themes will be
developed in this Article, some of which may be controversial and
may cause more trouble with my fellow feminists.7
First, this article will explore the relationship of real world
conditions to the development of legal theory, a relationship that
Elizabeth Schneider has described as "dialectical." 8 This section
will review some of the current conundrums and impasses of
4. The "first wave of feminism" was the women's movement for equality and suffrage
which began at Seneca Falls in 1848. See generally E. Daols, FEM iSM AND SUFFRAGE: THE
EMERGENCE oF AN INDEPENDENT WOMAN's MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869 (1978).
5. See EvANS, PERSONAL PoLmcs: T Rom OF WOMEN's LtEERATION IN THE CIVL
RIGHiTs MOvEMmr AND THE NEw LEFT (1980); Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical
Legal Studies and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. OF LEo. ED. 61,
62 (1988).
6. See generally Dunlap, The "F" Word: Mainstreaming and Marginalizing Feminism, 4
BEauLEY WoMtEN's L J. 251,258 (1989-90) (discussing how the Supreme Court has recently been
dealing with feminist legal issues). See also, Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences:
The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L REv. 25 (1990); Whitman, Review Essay,
Feminist Jurisprudence, 17 FMImNisT STuDIEs 493 (1991).
7. 1 am somewhat used to this position as one of the "defenders" of Carol Gilligan's work,
as applied to law. See GILoIGAN, IN A DiFFERENT VoicE (1982); Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A
Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lanyering Process, 1 BERKRI.EY WoMEN's U. 39,40
(1985) (hereinafter "'Portia"); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. RBv. 797,803-04, 810
(1989).
8. See generally Schneider, The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L REv. 589 (1986). See infra notes 20-57 and accompanying text.
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feminist legal theory--the "sameness-difference" debate, the
deconstruction of gender into the greater complexities of race, class
and sexual orientation9 and the "post-modernist turn" in feminist
legal theory. Although this Article will refer to "stages" of
feminist legal theory," I do not intend to treat these developments
hierarchically, even if they may appear so from a chronological
telling. These different "turns" in feminist theory and feminist
legal practice continue to exist and inform each other
simultaneously, in lawsuits, law review pages and in conversations
wherever feminist lawyers meet. However, it is important to keep
theory grounded in real world conditions, just as real world legal
struggles cause us to change or modify our theories. From this
perspective, I will be making judgments, always a painful process
for a feminist," since feminist theory is supposed to help us with
particular issues in enhancing women's material, political and
social conditions and when it doesn't do that, the theory must be
questioned. 12
Second, the Article will explore how feminist legal theory has
been affected by feminist inquiry in other disciplines.13 Women's
studies has proven to be one of the more successful efforts in
"transdisciplinary" knowledge production in the academy 4 as
well as having some effects in the real world.15 In particular, this
section focuses upon issues of feminist method and epistemology
9. See SPE.MAN, INESsENTIAL WOMAN (1988) (discussing the varieties of women's
experiences as filtered through different races, ethnicities, and classes).
10. Menkel-Meadow & Diamond, The Content, Method and Epistemology of Gender in
Sociolegal Studies, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 221, 225-27 (1991).
I1. The first modem explosion on this topic was a negative review of Kate Millet's diary,
FLYINO (1974), in Ms. magazine, which resulted in an outpouring of criticism that it was
"'unfeminist" to criticize a fellow sister. See MINER & LONGINO, COMPI'rIoN: A FwMrNrSr TABOO
(1987); HmsH & Ku.m., CoFUc'rs IN FImNsM (1990).
12. See Williams, supra note 7, and Abrams, Feminist Lawyering, 15 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY
373, 375 n.5 (1991) (criticizing the author).
13. See infra notes 58-101 and accompanying text.
14. See Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies: The Importance of Engaged Social
Science in Legal Studies, 18 FLA. ST. L REv. 91, 108 (1990) (contrasting efforts at transdisciplinary
work in law and social science with women's studies scholarship).
15. To wit, the development of battered women's shelters, see D. Martin, BATrmu WIVES
196-254 (1976); N. Matthews, STOPPING RAPE OR MANAGING ITS CONSEQUENCES? (1990) (rape
crisis centers).
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in the production and transmission of legal knowledge. Asking
feminist questions and questions about women in law1" has
revealed not only substantive deficiencies in the law, but process
deficiencies as well. At the same time, asking feminist or "the
woman question" in law has begun to produce a particular
morphology or structure of argument of its own which causes me
to wonder whether we need some new ways (or old ways) to
analyze on-going issues or to verify or falsify some of our
assertions and debates.
Third, and most important, this Article will attempt to
demonstrate how there has been a movement in the application of
feminist theory, from the more obvious arenas of "women's
issues" to the less obvious core and secondary fields of legal
doctrine. 7 This section will explore if and how feminist theory is
being "mainstreamed" into law so that new areas of legal doctrine
are feeling the effects of the "feminist" pebble "skimmed" on the
lake of masculinist or malestream law. To the extent it has, I will
begin to explore the larger consequences of this movement for the
development of legal doctrine, legal education and legal practice.
Feminists, as well as other theorists, will differ about whether it is
good for feminist theory to be "mainstreamed." There is the
problem of co-optation, transmutation or what in another context
I have called the "marble cake" problem (there is never enough
chocolate in an "integrated" white cake). 8 Yet it seems that if
the goals of feminist legal theory are to improve women's material,
political and psychological well being, we must ultimately have
feminist and women's concerns 9 expressed throughout the body of
16. See Wishik, The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence: To Question Everything, 1
BmumY woMEN's L . 64, 65 (1985).
17. See infra notes 121-207 and accompanying text.
18. Portia, supra note 7, at 48 n.56.
19. I will deflect for the moment the complex issues of how we know when an issue or
position is feminist or expresses "women's interests." See generally MAcKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED (1987) and TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1990) (discussing the political
debates about whether there are essentialist positions here or whether anyone can name them). See
also Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism
Unmodified, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 352 (1988); Colker, Feminism, Sexuality and Self: A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L REv. 217 (1988); Littleton, The Difference that
Method Makes, 41 STAN. L REv. 751 (1989); Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose
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laws that affect women and we must be heard by those who make,
interpret and enforce the law in all of its forms. For me, the
feminist project is ultimately a humanist project involving the
pursuit of equality, justice, safety, respect, compassion and well
being for all. Mainstreaming has its dangers, but it is also essential.
II. FEMNIST LEGAL THOUGHT REVIEWED
A. "Stages" of Feminism: The Genders of One, Two and Infinity
Legal feminism began with a simple principle which has been
the cornerstone of many movements for civil and political rights--
that all human beings should be treated with equality, respect and
justice--principles that have been derived from Enlightenment
political concepts embedded in our Constitution. So when women,
like blacks, demanded admittance to both political and civil society
they did so on the basis that they were humanly "the same" as the
white men who originally "founded" the polity.2" Thus, early
feminist work, including both litigation2 and the legal theories that
supported ie2 were based on claiming equality through the
Terms?, 75 CAL. L REV. 1559 (1987); Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1147 (1989); Menkel-Meadow, Review of MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State and
Rhode, Justice and Gender, 16 SIGNS 603 (1991) (reviews of these books by law professors
contesting the possibility of speaking for all women); see also Littleton, Does It Make Sense to Talk
About Women?, I UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 15 (1991).
20. See PA'EMAN, THE SEXUAL CoNTRACT (1988); OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY
(1989) (discussing the feminist questioning of foundational political theory and the formation of the
social contract).
21. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 501
(holding some form of sex discrimination unlawful under constitutional equal protection). Cf. Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding gender
discrimination with the appropriate level of governmental justification under the equal protection
clause); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (bona fide occupational qualification exceptions
under Title VII). One of the first legal arguments for "'sameness" equality was made in women's
efforts to become lawyers. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). See also Ginsburg and Flagg,
Some Reflections of the Feminist Legal Thought on the 1970's, 1989 U. CME. L REv. 9 (reflections
of one of the major pioneers in feminist litigation).
22. See Brown, Emerson, Freedman & Falk, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE LJ. 871 (1971).
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attributes of "sameness'"--men and women are the same and
should have equal rights. The goals of litigation included enforcing
equal rights and converting laws into gender neutral propositions23
that eliminated any preferences or biases in favor of one sex. This
included laws or practices that seemed to "benefit" women such
as the "tender years" doctrine in child custody,24 as well as those
that seemed to benefit men or to disadvantage women, such as
those involving social security and other public benefits.'
From the beginning there were differences, or at least issues,
with respect to which legal strategies to pursue in areas where
assimilation to a "sameness" argument would not work. Such
differences were specifically located in those "women's issues"
which required legal redress but which were rooted (either because
of their association with women's "different" bodies or because
they were perceived to grant women benefits) in women's
difference. The important reproductive rights cases which gave
women some control over their bodies' were based in "sex
neutral" privacy rights, a legal strategy that has met with much
feminist criticism as of late.27 In areas such as education, litigators
had to argue that girls should be able to play with boys on teams,
while school systems argued that "physical differences" hindered
safety and other concerns that required separation for nonequal
skills.28 In other contexts, I have called this the claim for equality
23. See BROWN, FREMAN, KATZ & PRICE, WoMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1977); K.
PEAtTIs & E. CARY, Wom[EN AND THE LAw (1977).
24. See J. ARE N, CAsEs AND MATmALS ON FAMILY LAW 536 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (sustaining the unequal veteran's
preference that disproportionately benefitted men in federal and state civil service jobs).
26. In my view, Roe v. Wade has always been a case protecting the medical profession
(mostly male) as well as women's rights of reproduction. See WOODWARD, THE BRETHREN: INSI3DE
THE StPRE M COURT (1979) (discussing Blackmun's important role, as seen through his involvement
with the Mayo clinic).
27. See Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984).
28. See Tokarz, Separate But Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The Need for a New
Theory of Equality, 1 BERKELEY W.LJ. 201,205-06 (1985) (criticizing the maintenance of separate
teams as enacting an inequality of experience that could only be justified by the "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1986), now rejected for purposes of equality analysis
under the equal protection clause). See also Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Assoc., 695 F.2d 1126
(9th cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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based on the sex of one; that is that women could be equal to men,
with the male gender defining the norm. 9
After the United States Supreme Court held that pregnancy
discrimination was not gender discrimination because nonpregnant
persons were both male and female,3" it became clear that real
differences between men and women could not be assimilated to
equality claims based on sameness, and a first crisis in feminist
legal theory developed. The "crisis" was temporarily averted when
Wendy Williams and other legal activists successfully lobbied for
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act which amended Title VII to treat
pregnancy as sex discrimination if male "disabilities" were
covered under employer health or benefits plans." The crisis was
averted only temporarily, however, when differential state treatment
of pregnancy (state laws that gave women who were pregnant
"more" benefits than general disability) caused feminists to
disagree on the issue of whether pregnancy should be treated
differently than other health conditions, based on women's different
"needs." 32 While feminist litigators were grappling with statutes
and constitutional theories which assumed equality required
similarity, feminist theorists in other disciplines, including
philosophy, literary criticism and the social sciences, were
confronting the differences that gender presented in the form of the
29. The recognition that appeals to equality, based on equivalency or sameness, encoded the
male as the norm came relatively soon after the first wave of constitutional, Title VII and Title IX
litigation. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983); Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279
(1987). For an excellent application of this fallacy in reasoning about gender differences for the
general public, see TAvRiS, TmE MisMAsuRE oF WoMAN (1992). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 10, at 225-26.
30. General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
31. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(A) (1978).
32. Miller-Wobl Co. v. Montana, 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981), vacated, 685 F. 2d
1088 (9th Cir. 1982). See Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action
and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GoLDEN GATi L.REv. 513 (1983); Williams, The Equality
Crisis: Some Rejlections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RPmR. 175 (1982).
The case which finally reached the Supreme Court on this issue, after separate briefs were filed by
a variety of feminist groups was Cal. Fed. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). See also Kay, Equality
and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 10-20 (1985).
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pregnant body,33  socially constructed differences in moral
reasoning,' differences in literary and artistic sensibilities35 and
new claims that women were different and in some ways superior
to men.3" Thus, a gender of one was replaced with a gender of
two, in which gender differences could be acknowledged and
indeed celebrated, or at least, as Chris Littleton has argued,
"'accommodated or rendered costless." ' 37
Yet the danger of difference theory as explored by many of its
critics" is that it necessarily sets up oppositional or binary
systems, with a hierarchy of value usually placed on one set of the
oppositions.39 As Carol Tavris has recently recognized, when
parents of two children are asked to talk about their children, they
define one in relation to the other--one is a leader, the other a
follower, one is sociable, the other is not. When parents of more
than two children speak of them, they talk in individual, not
comparative terms, one is an athlete, one is an intellectual, one is
sociable.' Binary polarities are reductionist and men and women
are seen only in the ways in which they can be compared to each
other, on both individual and group levels.
At about the same time that difference reared its complexifying
head, other women lawyers who were less sanguine about the
ability of conventional legal categories to accommodate to
women's needs developed a more systemic critique of the legal
system as creating, constituting and then reinforcing patriarchy.4 '
Perhaps the most influential feminist legal theorist, Catherine
33. WOLOAST, EQUALITY AND THE RioHs oF WOMEN (1980); EIsENSmIN, THE FEMALE
BODY AND TfE LAw (1988).
34. See Gilligan, supra note 7.
35. Oates, Is There A Female Voice?, in FERmST LrrERARY THEORY (M. Eagleton, Editor)
(1986).
36. This reaction to sameness-equality theory is alternatively known as difference theory or
cultural feminism.
37. Littelton, supra note 29, at 1337.
38. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 797, 802-22 (1989)
(discussing difference theory).
39. See Olsen, The Sex of Law, in Ti POLmcs OF LAW (D.Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990).
40. TAvRis, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMEN 90 (1992).
41. See Rifkin, supra note 1; Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy; THE PoLmcs
OF LAW (Kairys ed., 1982).
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MacKinnon, began to write about how legal categories created by
men defined rules that in turn constructed women and their rights
and limits in the legal system. Probably the first to use the more
high falutin term of "feminist jurisprudence," MacKinnon urged
feminists to rethink the entire legal system in which they were
operating to claim equality for women.42 MacKinnon saw
dominance and power relations where others saw either "innate"
essentialist differences or socially constructed ones, but in her
ground-breaking work in analyzing sexual harassment as workplace
discrimination43 and rape as male defined unacceptably violent
sex," MacKinnon caused a whole generation of feminist lawyers,
students and now finally, scholars, to step back and look at the
whole legal system through feminist eyes.
While this Article does not suggest that difference theory and
the notion of a feminist jurisprudential sensibility developed at
exactly the same time, the contiguity of these intellectual moments
is significant because of the various theoretical and political
ruptures that resulted from these developments in feminist legal
work. While the feminist legal community was never totally
uniform or without disagreement, early constitutional cases had
been won with near unanimity of legal strategies. Now there were
cleavages in the feminist legal community45 between "equality"
feminists and "difference" feminists, between "cultural" feminists
and "radical" feminists,46  between practical litigators and
academic theorists.
Yet, even here there are overlapping categories. MacKinnon's
theories, as radical as they seem to some, are always related to the
specific legal issues and reforms, such as rape, sexual harassment
42. Maclinnon, supra note 29. See also West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CH!. LREv.
1, 60-61 (1988).
43. See MAcKNNoN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WoRINo WoMEN (1978).
44. MacKinnon, supra note 29; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515-44 (1982).
45. Many of these cleavages had their counterparts in feminist splits in other fields as well,
such as literary criticism. See Feminist v. Feminist, LA Times, Apr. 29, 1992, D-1. See also HIRSH
& KELLER, supra note 11.
46. See Minow, Adjudicating Differences: Conflicts Among Feminist Lawyers, in HIRSH &
KEnER, supra note 11, at 149; West, supra note 42, at 3.
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and pornography, on which she has worked.47 Her theories then,
have been in service to her legal reform and transformative
agendas.48 Others have preferred the "battleground ' 49 of legal
theory and jurisprudence for reconstructing gender relations."
Two other "ruptures" have produced yet a third stage of
feminist theory, what I have referred to as an "infinity" of
genders. First, women of color and lesbian legal feminists criticized
the white, middle class assumptions of "essentialist" feminism
51
and suggested many ways in which gender experience and legal
treatment is filtered, as through the glass of a prism, through race,
class and other social characteristics that create a more varied
expression of gendered experience.52 Second, legal feminist
theorists, influenced by continental philosophy and French
feminism53 began to focus on poststructuralist, post-modernist
critiques of modernist conceptions of knowledge and the integrity
of the self.54 If to use Gertrude Stein's famous words, "there is
47. On the feminist debates on pornography see Hunter & Law, Brief Amicus Curiae of
Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce et aL, in American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH.
JL. REF. 69 (1987-88); MAcKINNON, ToWARD A FMINIST THEORY Op THE STATE 195-214 (1985).
48. MacKinnon is not alone in her combined feminist theorizing and lawyering. Other noted
authors and litigators are Nadine Taub, Wendy Williams, Chris Littleton, Sally Burns, Susan Ross,
and Sylvia Law.
49. In light of what I have previously written about the sexism of legal metaphors, I hesitate
to use war metaphors, but they are powerful when discussing law. See Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law
Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEa. ED. 3, 8 (1991).
50. West, supra note 42; Olsen, supra note 39; Frug, Re-reading contracts: A Feminist
Analysis ofa Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L REv. 1065 (1985); Colker, supra note 19.
51. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990);
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and AntiRacist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139;
Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKIJ.EY WOMEN's L. J. 191 (1989-90).
52. See Bobo, Black Women in Fiction and Non-Fiction: Images of Power and Poweriessness,
13 Wide Angle 72 (1991); CoLuiNs, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1990) (discussing the claims that
women of color may have particular experiences with rape, motherhood, family, abortion, community,
public/private splits that differ from white feminism). See also J. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1991)
(arguing that gender as a cultural construct can be manipulated by "play").
53. DE RIGUEUR crrEs ARE MARKS & DICouRiVRON, New FRENCH FEMINISMS (1980);
TORIL Moz, SEXUAL/XUAL POLITICS: FEMINIST LEoAL THEORY (1985); FRENCH CONNECTIONS:
VoICES FROM THE WoMEN's MovEMaNT IN FRANCE, (C. Duchen ed., 1987).
54. See Frug, A PostModern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105 HARv. L REV. 1045 (1992);
CORNELL, BEYoND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONmSTRUCnON AND THE LAw (1992);
Patterson, PostModernism,/FeminisnVLaw, 77 CORNELL L REV. 254 (1992). For an excellent review
of how post-modernist philosophy has influenced the social sciences, see generally PAULINE
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no there, there" because gender identity is fractured by the
multiple levels and socially constructed bases on which it exists,
theorists have begun to ask whether there is any core to feminism
if "woman" is totally socially constructed and fractured by
multiple and different experiences."
Feminist lawyers continue to struggle with the myriad ways in
which women continue to be disenfranchised or discriminated
against both in the legal system and in the larger world, such as in
poverty, in families, in abusive or violent encounters with men, and
in glass ceiling limits to workplace achievement. The challenge of
this "third" stage of feminist theory is to see whether the
encounter of post-modernist "big theory" 56 with real world
conditions will help us to transcend the divisions and splits among
feminists on practical legal issues or whether such intense
theoretical inquiries will implode upon themselves.
For those attempting a reconciliation of post-modernist theory
and politics,57 the key is the focus on local "micro-narratives"
and the contexts in which women's legal problems are experienced.
In a sense, then, this third stage returns us to where we began--with
the particularities of the ways in which law helps or hinders
women's social and political conditions. Thus, the three stages of
feminist theory identified above are responsive to the different
needs and audiences of women grappling with different issues in
different places. Feminist legal scholars who see their principal
audience as other legal scholars respond differently to issues than
those who are doing legal work in the streets or in the courts.
ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1992).
55. Hawkesworth, Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth, 14
SIGNS 533 (1989); FLAX, THNKINo FRAGMENTS, PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM AND
POSTMODERNISM IN Tm AMERICAN WEST (1989); Gagnier, Feminist Post-Modernism: The End of
Feminism or the Ends of Theory, in RHODE, ed., THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL
DwIERENCE (1990); YOUNG, JUSTICE AND TnE POLITICS OF DIFERENCE (1990).
56. In a sense the phrase in the text is an oxymoron. Postmodernism decries "big theory" or
metanarratives or globalized statements and prefers local or micronarratives- "smaller" truth claims
based on rooted experience. See ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES xii-xih
(1992).
57. See HANDLER, POST-MODERNISM, PROTESTS AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVMENTS (1992)
(manuscript on fide with the author) (presidential address, Law and Society Association, May 1992).
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B. The Contexts of Feminist Legal Theory I: "Women's Issues"
As reviewed above, earliest feminist theory responded to
women's needs in a number of different ways. Like the black civil
rights movement before it,5" feminist activist lawyers used test
case strategies to ask the Supreme Court to recognize formal
equality as a matter of constitutional law.59 Feminist activists
working on particular issues effecting woman's lives "attacked"
doctrines in areas close to women's interests--family law reform,
criminal law, rape, abortion, employment, education and domestic
violence.'
Feminists organized (with medical activists) on the issues of
reproductive rights and developed lawsuits as a concerted effort to
mobilize both social action groups and legal reform at the same
time.6 Yet the legal strategy that culminated in Roe v. Wade62
employed old legal categories to construct a genderless "right to
58. R. KLUGER, SmLE Jusncm THE IsTo oR F BRowi . BoARD oP EDucaTOv AND
BLACK AMmuCAN'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALrTY (1976).
59. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that gender is an impermissible
classification for preferring probate administrator); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(holding that general stereotypes in statutory entitlement programs can be constitutionally
impermissible).
60. In another important moment in feminist legal theory development, several law students
organized the first Women in the Law conference in 1969 at NYU to address issues affecting women
in the law. The conference has since met every year and one way of measuring the growth and
expansion of "women's issues" is to compare the numbers and types of sessions that have increased
from year to year. As the audience of feminist legal theory began to include an increasing number
of women and male feminist students, pressures to first offer and then increase the numbers of
courses on Women and Law, helped develop the first generation of legal theory. The movement to
Feminist Jurisprudence recounted in the text has had its analog in legal education as courses moved
from a survey in women and the law to seminars on feminist jurisprudence and legal theory and
particular legal issues like rape, domestic violence, reproduction, etc. See Kay & Littleton, Feminist
Jurisprudence Text Notes, in KAY, SEX-BASED DIScRIMINATIoN 884 (3rd ed. 1988). See also From
the Editors, 38 1. LEGAL ED. (1988) (special issue on women in legal education).
61. For an in depth discussion of the legal reproductive rights movements, see Schneider,
supra note 8; GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RiGHT (1977); LUKER, ABORTION AND Th E
PoLrncs op MoTHERHoOD (1984). As I write this and the ruling of Roe v. Wade hangs in jeopardy,
hundreds of thousands of women are marching today in Washington in a social protest movement
for choice and abortion that continues to mobilize the female and male feminist populace.
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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privacy" which protects both female bodies and male medical
establishments. 63
In a variety of areas, feminist lawyers sought to remove gender
bias from laws which made assumptions about men's or women's
roles based on stereotypes of gender appropriate roles, in ways that
restricted women's choices or actions." As any review of the first
editions of sex discrimination texts will reveal,' early legal cases
had to do with women's right to bear their own names, establish
their own legal domicile, acknowledge their own criminal
responsibility, earn their own separate legal identities for the
purpose of contracting and engaging in other legal and commercial
activities, own their own property, control their own children, end
their own marriages and earn access to employment, support and
public benefits that could assist, if not guarantee, some modicum
of financial equality or self-determination.'
Even within the agreement to seek "equality" within the
obvious spheres of women's experiences, early differences of
theory emerged. In the family law area, Martha Fineman argued
that efforts to neutralize legal conceptions of parenthood led to
"losses" of custody for women in ways which ignored the actual
parenting experiences of women.67 Kate Bartlett, on the other
hand, argued that without using the law to enforce "neutral"
gender equalizing concepts such as "joint custody," women would
forever be trapped in conventional sex-stereotyped roles. 68  And
63. Of course, for the many critics of abortion and constitutional law, the legal cloth from
which the right to privacy has been woven is considered the creation of new categories. Privacy,
derived from the "penumbras and emanations" of the fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments of the
Constitution, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is not found in the text of the
constitution. TaIe, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTMS 82-83 (1990).
64. See Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se As Form of Employment
Discrimination, 21 B.C. L REv. 345, 345-418 (1980).
65. See KANowrrz, SEX RoL.Es iN LAW AND Socmy (1973); GINSBURG & KAY, SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION (1974); BABCOCK, FREEDMAN, NORTON & Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION (1975).
66. See, e.g., People ex rel Rago v. Lipsky, 327 111. App. 63 (1945); Carlson v. Carlson, 75
Ariz. 308 (1953); United States v. Lazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1921); See supra note 22 (listing cases analyzing this proposition).
67. FINEMAN, TPE ILLUSION oF EQUArITY: THE RHErORIC AND REALITY o DIVORCE
REFORM (1991).
68. See Bartlett & Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY
WOMEN's LJ. 9 (1986).
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after long efforts to reform divorce law to permit women to exit
more easily oppressive marriages, 9 empirical studies now show
that more "equalized" no-fault regimes actually create enormous
inequalities of economic situations for women and men and their
children, following divorce.7" Thus, eliminating "gender bias" by
neutralizing husbands and wives and mothers and fathers into more
equal spouses and parents (that ignored the situated differences of
these roles)7" helped expose how formal and rhetorical equality
was not entirely responsive to women's needs for substantive,
actual or outcome equality.
Efforts to either equalize or make various forms of legal
regulation gender neutral did not really deal with the real social
"causes's of gender inequality, or more accurately
"oppression." 7 2 The domination or oppression of women was
effected in the physical fear or economic limits and reluctance that
women were subjected to as a result of male "sexual
terrorization" 73 of women through rape, domestic violence and
sexual harassment.
In attempting to deal with these larger social problems, feminist
legal activists and theorists found the old legal categories would
69. Marcus, Locked in and Locked Out: Reflections on the History of Divorce Law Reform
in New York State, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 375 (1988-89); Marcus, Reflections on the Significance of the
Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. MIAMI L REV. 55 (1987); Kay,
Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CINN, L. REV.
1 (1987); JACOBS, SILENT REvoLUTroN: THE TRANSOFORMA 1ON OF DIVORCE LAW IN ThE UNrmD
STATEs (1988); Blumberg, Reworking the Past, Imagining the Future On Jacob's Silent Revolution,
16 LAW & Soc. INQ. 115 (1991).
70. LENORE WErZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323 (1985).
71. See Blumberg, Review Essay ofFineman"s Illusion of Equality, 2 U.C.LA. WOMEN'S LJ.
(1992) (discussing economic disadvantages to women after divorce in both community property and
equitable distribution regimes).
72. Oppression is a strong word and many are reluctant to use it in the context of gender, as
compared to race or class subordination. But women's oppression or domination as a class is real
enough in the physical oppression and violence that women experience, across all class, race and
ethnic divides.
73. The term sexual terrorization has long been used in women's studies scholarship to
describe the emotional and subjective fear that women have, given their physical vulnerability to
men, through rape and other forms of physical domination. Recently Mary Joe Frug eloquently
applied these notions to how law's failure to adequately control male physical force serves to
"terrorize" women through their experience of bodily vulnerability. Frug, A Feminist PostModern
Legal Manifestq, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1992). The tragic irony of this writing is that Mary Joe
herself was murdered by such anonymous male violence.
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not work.74 New theories or causes of action were created and
legal definitions were radically altered by putting women's
experience at the center of the law-making function. For example,
Catherine MacKinnon crafted new claims by demonstrating that
sexual harassment was sex discrimination at work because women,
seen as stereotypic sex objects, were asked to give sexual favors
for work benefits in ways that men were not." Susan Estrich and
others demonstrated that rape laws were constructed with a male
concept of sex,76 both in terms of legal definitions of rape itself
and the gendered expectations of consent and other defenses,"
resulting in massive state law reform changing definitions of rape
or by common law or statute eliminating or curtailing certain
defenses.7"
As women sought to defend themselves from habitual beatings
in domestic situations by murdering sleeping husbands, feminist
lawyers crafted new defenses, such as the controversial "Battered
Woman Syndrome"'79 which attempted to account for women's
different "non-masculine" forms of self-help. This defense of
"learned helplessness," developed from a structural argument of
"difference" in response to violence, is now in as much
theoretical, as well as practical trouble, as difference theories are
in general.8" Feminist theorists and lawyers argue about whether
the learned helplessness defense, which relies upon expert
witnesses, continues to paint a picture of women based on passivity
74. For example, marital rape was not a crime.
75. MacKinnon, supra note 43.
76. ESTRiCH, REAL RAPE (1987); Goldberg-Ambrose, Theory, Practice and Perception in Rape
Law Reform, 23 LAW & Soc. REv. 949 (1989) (reviewing EsTmcI, REAL RAPE); MacKinnon,
SIGNS, supra note 44.
77. The gendered understanding of such issues as "consent" remain unresolved as recent
occurrences of individual and group gang rapes become subjected to more public treatment and
scrutiny. See SANDAY, FRATERNT GANG RAPE (1990). We see how differently men and women
respond to the circumstances, see William Kennedy Smith rape trial, Florida rape trial, etc.
78. For a discussion of laws concerning a woman's prior sexual history, see Letwin, Unchaste
Character: Ideology and California Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 35 (1980); Berger,
Man's Tria4 Woman's Tribulations: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L REV. 1 (1977).
79. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self Defense, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L REv. 623 (1980); Schneider, Describing and Changing Women 's Self Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Bartering, 9 WoMEN's RTs L. REP. 195 (1986).
80. See supra note 38 (discussing TAN 39-4).
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and dependence, that while successfully acquitting women who
murder their husbands, also confirms stereotypic images of woman
as passive victims in their subordinated conditions. Other feminist
theorists and activists prefer to see women as agents of their own
release from violence, but this may inherently compromise the self-
defense theory.
81
The most dramatic and controversial of the "new legal
theories" to confront women's subordination was the MacKinnon-
Dworkin campaign to create a civil rights action based on the
harms of pornography to women. Rather than focusing upon a
criminalization strategy that would more clearly implicate first
amendment defenses and would also leave women dependent on
the vagaries of state power for enforcement, 3 the pornography
civil rights ordinance sought to put women in control, by granting
them the right to sue over what they felt caused them harm. The
significance of the effort to legislate in this area, while developing
a theory of feminist legal action, is an exemplar of how theory and
action work together. By attempting to define pornography from
the perspective of what is considered harmful, hurtful or offensive
to women, MacKinnon and Dworldn decentered the subject of law,
to use the phrases of post-modernism. Pornography was defined
from the perspective of women, not men, though whether the
definitions satisfied all women became part of the controversy.
84
The pornography campaign and the legal debate which
followed, both in the courts"5 and in the academic and activist
81. See Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our
Moral Culpability Judgments, 7 SOC. PHLO. & POL 59 (1990); Schulhofer, The Gender Question
in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHiLo. & PoL 105, 116-30 (1990).
82. MacKinnon, supra note 19, at 195. Brest & Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism and the
Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1987).
83. The issue of women's reliance on the state for equality is enormous and is beyond the
scope of this paper. See Menkel-Meadow, Comments in Dubois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon &
Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. REV.
11, 86 (1985); MacKinnon, supra note 19, at 157. In short, feminists' and women's relationship to
the state, as to the law, has to be one of ambivalence. The state offers up some protection, but at the
same time it is the source or enforcer of oppressive regimes as well.
84. FACT Brief, supra note 47.
85. Hudnut v. American Booksellers Asso., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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discourse86 demonstrates at least three important aspects of the
feminist legal theory project. First, the reactions of the "liberal"
"progressive" or "ACLU feminists" and a lot of lesbian feminists
to the pornography campaign demonstrated the difficulties of
asserting an "essentialist" woman's position. These women
claimed that any regulation of pornography would limit their
consumption of texts, including the health manual "Our Bodies
Ourselves," as well as feminist and lesbian erotic literature.87
Women could no more "know it when they saw it" then could
justices on the Supreme Court, so any claim that "women" as a
category could define pornography was doomed to fail and left
open the usual debates of who would make the important ultimate
determinations.
Second, the crafting of the statutes incorporated (and we can
now say "foreshadowed") a new perspective on legal decision-
making--the substitution of the presumed neutral "reasonable man"
standard, which in fact enacts a gendered understanding of reality
through a neutral facade, with the now recognized, at least, in some
contexts "reasonable woman "" standard, recognizing that
perspective matters greatly in legal decision-making.89
Third, the controversy over the pornography legislation, with
claims of first amendment violations, has caused a reconsideration
of first amendment jurisprudence and has convinced a host of
constitutional scholars, including some men, that our readings of
"neutral" constitutional principles are in fact gendered, or that at
least particular readings may privilege particular interests over
86. Minow, supra note 46.
87. See FACT Brief, supra note 48, at 109,120-22. See also VANcE, PLEASURE AND DANGER:
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 5 (C. Vance ed., 1984)
88. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceloa Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1986); Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, Multiple Perspectives in
Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, I TEX. J. OF WOMEN AND LAW 95 (1992).
89. Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10
(1987); Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives,
1991 DuKE L J. 413. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 59 (suggesting that all legal decision-
making and fact-finding would be benefitted by having both male and female judges). See also
Resnik, On the Bias, Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations of Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1877 (1988).
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others.' ° This new reading of the exceptions to first amendment
absolutism has already had important jurisprudential and practical
effects on regulation in other areas, most notably, the regulation of
racist hate speech.91
Feminist legal work on what began as "women's issues" has
led to several important developments in feminist legal theory and
jurisprudence. First, attempts to use conventional legal categories
did not always work and the legal categories had to be
reconstructed or redefined (such as the self-defense argument for
battered women). Second, new categories of legal analysis (new
definitions of rape) or new causes of action had to be created to
deal with women's legal regulatory and social experiences.
Feminist legal theorists also demonstrated a third insight about
the structure of legal reasoning in that the categories themselves
could not be maintained separately. There was, using the word in
a feminist sense, a "bleeding" of categories that was required to
redress women's concerns and needs.' One of the best examples
of this is the work done by Chris Littleton on the pregnancy leave
cases referred to above. Conventional legal analysis pointed to
equality of treatment in the workplace by arguing that pregnancies
should not be treated more favorably than other conditions with
temporary disability. However, if pregnancy was not treated
differently then there would be inequality of parenthood, as men
could have children with no adverse effects on their employment.
Littleton artfully demonstrated how true equality would require a
regime in which neither employment nor parenthood would be
burdened on the basis of gender. In order for people to experience
90. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REv. 826 (1988); Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L REv. 4, 17
(1986);Brest, supra note 82; Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L. J. 447, 480-508 (1984).
91. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L
REv. 2320 (1989); Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DuKE L. J. 431 (1990).
92. This notion of"bleeding" ortransdisciplinary categories is also reflected in the categories
of knowledge produced by feminist work. Bibliographers and librarians must develop categories for
classifying work that defies conventional categories, like the new feminist interdisciplinary field of
"'body-ology." See Shelton, Wrestling with Women's Studies: Endeavors in Cross-Disciplinary
Collection Building, U.C.L.A. LIBRARIAN (March, 1992) at 5.
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equality of working parenthood, pregnancy leaves had to be
sustained.9" Similarly, at the jurisprudential level, Fran Olsen,
employing analysis derived from womens' studies scholarship
outside of law, argued that legal regimes sustained separation of the
market or public sphere from that of the private or family sphere
and the symbiotic relationship of the one on the other served to
oppress women.
94
Echoing developments in general feminist theory that writers
assumed a white middle class woman in their theorizing about
women's conditions,95 women of color and lesbians demonstrated
that feminist legal theory seemed to be assuming a feminist
essentialism. For example, Kim Crenshaw argued that
antidiscrimination law permitted successful challenges to
antidiscrimination only if "victims" claimed either race
discrimination as blacks or sex discrimination as women, but were
unsuccessful if they had been discriminated on the double axis of
being a black female.9" Angela Harris exposed the essentialist
assumptions of the feminist jurisprudence written by Catherine
93. Littleton, Brief Amici Curia of Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace,
California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra, No. 85-494 (1985). See Dowd, Maternity Leave:
Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 699 (1986); Dowd, Work and Family:
The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace,
24 HARv. C.R.-C.L L. REv. 79 (1989); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COL L. REv. 1118 (1986).
94. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1497 (1983).
95. As political scientist Carole Patemen recently pointed out in conversation with me,
however, the earliest feminist anthologies of theory, taken from the more "'grassroots" days of the
feminist movement, in fact contained much writing by women of-color and lesbians. See, e.g.,
MORGAN, SISTERHOOD IS POwERFL AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS FROM THE WoMEN's
LIBERATION MOvEMENT (1970). One of the most outspoken early leaders of the feminist movement
was the black civil rights lawyer, Florynce Kennedy. In my view, feminist theory became more white
and middle class as its theorizing moved from the living rooms to the academy, where white middle
class women had greater relative success in entering the inner sanctum of power than did women of
color. See Barbara Reskin, Reskin Study (Ohio State) of Women of Color in Law Teaching, Daily
Bruin, April 3, 1992.
96. Crenshaw, supra note 51. Judy Scales-Trent made a similar argument with respect to how
constitutional treatment under the equal protection clause failed to remedy the particular kinds of
mistreatment that black women suffered, as black women. Scales-Trent, Black Women and the
Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REV. 9 (1989). See also
Caldwell, A Hairpiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L. L 365
(1991) (discussing how the dilemmas of black women's hairstyles reflect their issues of identity).
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MacKinnon and Robin West, criticizing in particular their
assumptions that women are always dominated by men in the same
way97 or that femaleness is always characterized by valuation of
connectedness over autonomy.98 Harris argues that black women
necessarily must experience themselves through more multiple
identities because of the various roles they have played historically
in our society.99 Pat Cain, Ruth Colker and Janet Halley have
similarly deconstructed the heterosexist assumptions of much
feminist legal scholarship that assumes connections to men as an
essential determinant of woman's condition in the world. "
Even focusing on "women's issues" in the law, namely those
substantive areas and their jurisprudential underpinnings that most
directly affect women, feminist lawyers have come to recognize
that multiple theories and multiple legal categories will have to be
employed. "Women's Law" as it is called in some other
countries"'1 must necessarily involve other areas of law, as it
must deal with all of the variations of women's experience.
97. Harris demonstrates how MacKinnon's account of rape is an account of white, rather than
black, women's experience of rape. Harris, supra note 51, at 594.
98. See West, supra note 42; Harris, supra note 51 (discussing West's treatment of
motherhood, intercourse, and pregnancy as a different "self' conception than that of males,
particularly those writing about human nature).
99. Patricia Williams eloquently and poetically makes similar claims, by exploring her own
"oxymoronic" position as a black female commercial law professor, as the great granddaughter of
a slave, raped by a white lawyer master. See WnLhiM~s, THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTs
(1990). See also Menkel-Meadow, The Power ofNarrative in Empathetic Learning: Post-Modernism
and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA Women's L. J. (1992).
100. This connection can either be of the subordinating dominance decried by MacKinnon or
the more positive cast of the "affiliational" feminists, see West supra note 42; Gilligan supra note
7; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
101. See Dahi, Taking Women as a Starting Point: Building Women's Law, 14 INT'L J. SOC.
LAW 239 (1986) (discussing "Women's" Law as a function of what women need from law in
Norway).
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C. The Context of Feminist Legal Theory II: The "Core"
Doctrinal Areas
As feminist legal theorists began to explore the limitations of
law in ameliorating women's disadvantages in society' 2 several
new turns were taken in feminist theorizing regarding the role of
law in the feminist project to improve the conditions of women.
First, building on MacKinnon's legal theories, some legal scholars
such as Deborah Rhode and Martha Minow called for more
nuanced, contextually based legal standards, rather than the more
protean, neutral-sounding constitutional and statutory standards that
were now decried as "masculinist" by masking, with their neutral
objectivity, their actual disempowering, unequalizing effect. Rhode
argued for a standard that would ask whether women were to be
actually disadvantaged by particular legal rules or practices,
10 3
requiring both lawyers and judges to examine particular laws and
actions within the context in which they are situated. °" This of
course leaves legal decision-makers with a great deal of discretion,
in areas which abound with political and cultural differences to
determine whether particular activities hurt or hinder women. 5
A second effort sought to look behind the given fields in which
legal doctrine was developed to analyze the basic underlying
concepts, principles and assumptions that informed conventional
legal doctrine. Like efforts to scrutinize the canon in literature,
periodization in history, standards of aesthetics in art and
epistemology in philosophy, this bold new feminist project sought
102. One feminist critic has pessimistically called law as "juridogenic" to women; that law
causes harm as it is used to correct women's inequalities. SMART, FENMmSM AND THE POWER OF
LAW 12 (1989).
103. RHODE, JUSTicE AND GENDER 5 (1989).
104. This is responsive, for example, to a concern that legislation which may seem to benefit
women, such as pregnancy leaves, may in fact burden women by making them more expensive to
employ as reflected in the concerns about protective labor legislation in the early decades of this
century. See Williams, supra note 32.
105. See Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE U. 913
(1983); Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court
Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L REV. 265 (1984).
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to deconstruct the absences, silences and ellipses of treatment of
issues of interest to women in the "core" subjects of law.1"
The following discussion of feminist critiques of legal doctrine
is divided into two categories: First, the "core" subjects of any
f'rst year legal curriculum, recognized as the foundational building
blocks of law; and the more specialized subject area bodies of law
that commonly comprise what we think of as the "upperlevel"
curriculum."01 Second, the analysis attempts to identify the
patterns, structure, or morphology of the feminist arguments about
law and doctrine. Following on the first wave of feminist theorizing
informed by real world problems, a second wave of scrutiny of
man-made laws has produced some commonalities of feminist
reasoning or argumentation that should themselves be subjected to
analysis, debate and scrutiny. If feminist theories about law,
doctrine and jurisprudence are to be used to change women's actual
conditions, the arguments must be "mainstreamed," that is,
debated within the larger conversations of doctrinal development
and the meaning of law from both a jurisprudential and a
sociological perspective. Some of this conversation °B is already
occurring in particular areas such as constitutional and family law
where women's issues cannot be ignored, but in other areas great
resistances are still in evidence. Indeed, as Mary Joe Frug recounts
in her recent analysis of contract law, the AALS Section on
106. Elsewhere I have argued that this development occurred not only because feminist lawyers
needed to examine the underlying principles of laws that were affecting decisions relating to women,
but also because as more women entered the legal academy, their writing and teaching as feminists
caused them to examine the implications of what they were teaching for women. Menkel-Meadow,
Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal Education or the "Fem-Crits" Go to Law
School, 38 3. LEGAL ED. 61 (1988); Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1982). lIfI argued in Portia In a Different
Voice, that women lawyers would change the practice of law, I argue here that more women legal
scholars and teachers will transform the concepts, as well as the teaching of law. See Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 7, at 55-63.
107. One could, of course, analyze these divisions within the curriculum from a feminist
perspective by asking what principles inform the assigning of categories. See generally G. LAKOI',
WOMEN, Fate AND DANGEROUS THcS: WHAT CATEwRmis REvEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987)
(discussing how categorization structures our thinking).
108. See Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 115, 138 (1989) (anticipating
some of the debates and conversations among feminists and anti-feminists in law).
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Contracts, through Professor David Slawson, could not see how
contract law "could possibly be affected by feminist analysis.""
1. The Patterns of Feminist Argument
The basic structures of argument identified in this Article are
as follows: First, as explored above, is the use of conventional
legal categories applied to women, such as including "equality"
from the Constitution, in employment, and family law, and
"privacy" for reproductive rights. Second, is the recrafting of old
legal categories to meet the specific needs or experiential
conditions of women. The examples here include new readings of
"consent" in rape and expanded readings of exceptions to first
amendment jurisprudence.
Third, is the exposure of gender bias in "malestream" law in
a number of ways. The law may assume male experience as the
norm, just as medicine has recently been exposed for basing its
propositions and predictions about health on male only subject
studies."' The law may not recognize women's interests in its
articulation and enforcement. Feminists have argued that the failure
to enforce domestic relations contracts with the same vigor as
commercial contracts is one such example.' Law, in assuming
its neutrality and objectivity (which is in fact constructed on an
"objectivity" of male experience in law making and interpretation)
109. Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1992).
110. See More, The Cholesterol Myth, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1989, at 37 (discussing the
famous male only Framingham studies on the effects of cholesterol in heart disease); Dresser,
Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, 22(1) HASITNGS CENTER REPORT 24 (Jan.-Feb.
1992); TAVRIS, TI MISMEASURE OF WoMAN (1992), Ch. 3 (reviewing a variety of medical
conclusions reached by employing males only for study).
111. See Dalton, An Essay in the Destruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997 (1984);
Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of A Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1065,
1078 (1985) (discussing the female role in contracts cases as part of a domestic arrangement). See
also Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981) (holding that unmarried
cohabitants may recover some property following separation); Coombs, Agency and Partnership: A
Study of Breach of Promise Plaintiffs, 2 YALE J.L. AND FEMINIsM 1 (1989) (discussing the
importance of relational feminism in contract law).
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may not consider its differential impact upon women. Thus, only
a masculinist view of pregnancy could see nonpregnant
classifications as not gendered, or breadwinner assumptions in
Social Security could assume men only in such roles. Most
interestingly, recent work has begun to explore the historical
circumstances under which particular rules were established at
common law or by legislatures with sexist assumptions or gendered
interpretations of earlier eras, exposing the lack of "neutrality" in
the most innocuous of rules.
112
Fourth, and perhaps most evocative, provocative and
controversial, are claims from a wide variety of legal scholars
analogizing (as lawyers have been taught to do) from Carol
Gilligan's work that gender difference (whether based on social
construction or more essentialist views of gender) will produce
different laws, legal practices and legal methods when women's
values are recognized and acknowledged in the legal system."1
Across a broad spectrum of legal doctrines, methods and practices,
feminists (both male and female) have argued that the articulation
of "women's values" of care, connection, nurturance, sensitivity
to others, experienced-based reasoning will transform many aspects
of legal doctrine, as well as practice. 4
Fifth, what some view as a subset of the "difference" school
is an analysis of how male dominance operates to hold women in
their legal, as well as social places, asserting that laws must be
analyzed and debated with a specific, particularized view of how
they disempower, or disadvantage women. This view explains the
emphasis on areas of law where women are physically,
112. See Vandervelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's
Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE LJ. 775 (1992) (discussing deconstruction of the
specific performance rules as developed through the consideration of contract and labor principles
applied to female entertainers).
113. See, e.g., Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan
and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L R v. 1 (1990).
114. It is somewhat interesting to note that with all of the criticisms of Gilligan's gender
difference theory, the difference arguments for proposed changes in the conceptualization of law far
outnumber the other structures of arguments from a feminist perspective. See Williams, supra note
7, at 802-821. For criticisms of Gilligan's work see, e.g., Symposium, 50 Soc. REsEARCH 576 (1983)
and Kerber, Some Cautionary Words for Historians, 11 SIGNS 304, 309 (1986).
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economically and emotionally hurt by the operation of law,
particularly violence against women (rape and domestic abuse),
pornography, health law (RU486 regulation)," 5 family law"16
and welfare law." 7
Sixth, and also related to difference arguments, are claims that
laws must be made responsive to the specificity of women's
particular needs, which is in turn an effort to transform legal
discourse on constitutional and statutory entitlements to a more
humane emphasis on needs particularized to the groups of
individuals who articulate a need to be recognized by law and the
state. One part of this argument is the feminist-critical legal studies
critique of rights as an empowering device for women when legal
rights operate most successfully on a rhetorical level and less so on
a material level." 8
Finally, most recently, some feminists in law, like feminists in
other disciplines," 9 have made claims for feminist methods,
115. See, e.g., Ricks, The New French Abortion Pill: The Moral Property of Women, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEN=SM 75 (1989).
116. In this context, family law specifically deals with the work on government benefit
entitlements and other economic issues. See, e.g., Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in Social
Security, 32 STAN. L. REV. 233, (1980); Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. R . 1125 (1981).
117. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 169; Law,
Women, Work Welfare and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PENN. L. REv 1249 (1983);
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs.
G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990).
118. See Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX.L. REv. 387
(1984); Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It Losing It, 38 J. LEG. ED. 47 (1988); Rhode, Feminist
Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990); KFLMAN, A GUIDE TO CRrTcAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987) (discussing rights as both an empowering device for women and a rhetorically empty device
for women). See also West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L. J. 81 (1985); FRASER, UNRULY PRACICES (1989);
Fineman, supra note 68; Littleton, supra note 30 (discussing the appeal to women's needs); Becker,
supra note 117; Law, supra note 117. The "needs" feminists are also implicated in the larger
jurisprudential discussion of group versus individual rights.
119. Looking at how feminists in other disciplines have characterized their contributions
indicates other ways of categorizing the "data" of women's contributions. Feminist scholarship is
"corrective" when it points out absences of women, "celebratory" when it adds the achievements
of women to the canon of men, otherwise known as cultural feminism, transformative when it adds
new categories of analysis in a wide variety of fields, such as public-private, ecriture feminine, and
standpoint epistemology. DuBois E' AL, FEMINIST SCHOLARSHip: KINDLo IN THE GRoVES Op
ACADEME (1985); LANGLAND & Gov., FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE ACADEMY (1981). Skeptics
still ask: "Does feminism have a theory?" Ifso, what is it? Most feminists would refuse the notion
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methodologies and epistemologies12  that they argue will
transform the way we produce legal knowledge, legal doctrines and
practice, as well as the way we think about law, based on the
situated, positioned and contextualized experiences that women
have with the law.' By examining the concrete applications of
feminist analysis to conventional doctrines of law we can see how
varied and successful these intellectual strategies are and begin to
assess how they will be "mainstreamed" in legal theory and
doctrine. Will they be assimilated, deformed, transformed, and
ignored or instead serve to transform the law itself?
2. The Arguments Applied to Core Doctrine
Starting with the core law subjects of criminal law, torts,
property and contracts, we can see how feminist lawyers and legal
scholars have demonstrated ways in which legal doctrine ignores
women's experiences and must begin to be inclusive of women's
interests. This may appropriately be labeled as "the corrective"
strategy.
Feminist lawyers focused upon situations where crimes against
women did not take account of women's experience. In the rape
area, rape was defined in terms of penetration and required
resistance, and consent was interpreted to include such activities as
the victim's past sexual history and her conduct and dress at the
time of the rape. As both MacKinnon and Estrich have
demonstrated, rape was defined in male terms and with
requirements and defenses that at least have the effect of
minimizing the behavior that is actually punished in our system.
Similarly, feminist lawyers and activists demonstrated that women
suffering from abusive behavior in their homes were unable to have
of "a" or "the" theory. We are committed to multiple understandings of reality and regard efforts
at global statements as reductionist. See J. DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE INtELLEcTuAL
TRADMONS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM (1985).
120. See HARDING, FEMINISM AND MumooLoOY (1987); HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUEsTION
IN FEMINISM (1986) (discussing the distinctions between feminist methods, methodologies and
epistemologies).
121. See Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L REV. 829 (1990) (discussing feminist
transdisciplinary knowledge).
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the criminal justice system treat their victimization as serious."
Efforts on the part of both lawyers and academics called attention
to this disparate enforcement of the criminal laws of assault and
battery as new causes of action for spouse abuse were created at
the same time that conventional criminal prosecution was applied
to domestic abuse. As outlined above, the theoretical response to
women as criminal defendants has been more controversial in the
competing perspectives on when women should be excused from
killing their abusers.123
Illustrating another strategy of legal analysis, Mary Coombs has
supplied a feminist analysis of justifications and rationales for
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. This theory employs
feminist concepts of relationships and privacy to analyze traditional
doctrinal questions of who may consent to searches.
1 24
In the torts area several scholars have pointed to devaluation of
women's experiences in the recognized categories of tort liability,
the failure to recognize women's injuries and the application of
presumed "neutral" but in fact sexist standards for judging
behavior and imposing liability. 5 Such scholars have pointed to
the gendered assumptions of the "reasonable man" standard and
asked to what extent is a man actually intended in the objective
standards of care required? This standard may now be subject to
rethinking as at least some courts have adopted a "reasonable
woman" standard in the area of sexual harassment126 while
others urge us to consider rape liability from the reasonable
122. MARTN, BATERED WIVES (1976); Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of
Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U.CHIt. L. FORUM. 23 (1989).
123. Schneider, supra note 79.
124. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendmen4 or the Rights of Relationships, 75
CAL. L REV. 1593 (1987).
125. See, e.g., Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 3
(1988); Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA L REV. 759 (1990); Finley, A Break
in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, I YAI.E J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989). See
also Donovan & Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense
and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 435 (1981); Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade
& Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 495 (1988); Love, Tortious Interference
With the Parent Child Relationship: Loss ofAn Injured Person 's Society and Companionship, 51 IND.
L. J. 591 (1976).
126. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing cases addressing the "reasonable
woman" standard).
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woman's perspective. 27 Women's rights to be compensated for
loss of consortium of husband and children have now been
recognized, as well as, in limited circumstances, compensation for
emotional distress for the loss of a loved one.1 28
Lucinda Finley argues for the application of conventional tort
docirine to injuries suffered by women in such notorious mass tort
cases as DES, Dalkon Shield and now breast implants, raising
important issues about whether the legal system is able to account
for the particular injuries and harms that women feel when their
reproductive capacities are lost or other "gendered" injuries are
suffered.129  Leslie Bender goes further and, utilizing the
difference strategy of argument, suggests that women's values of
care and connection might reconstruct negligence standards to
account for a higher level of caution and care and liability for
one's actions because of women's greater likelihood to care for
others."
In property, scholars like Peggy Radin and Carol Rose have
explored the limits of what may properly be the subject of
ownership, including property rights in the integrity of one's body,
a woman's concern when linked to reproductive and sexual
capacities and the justifications for ownership in our society.'
That women have been property, both under Blackstone's regime
of coverture and under slavery, may, as Patricia Williams has
127. This of course raises issues of false consciousness among women as we listen to some of
the reactions to notorious rape trials like those of William Kennedy Smith (what was she doing at
the Kennedy estate after midnight?) and fraternity rapes like Laurel's in Sanday's book. See supra
note 77 (expressing the view that if she was drunk and on drugs she asked for it, rather than the
drugs and alcohol precluded her ability to consent).
128. See generally, cases collected in Bender, supra note 126 and Finley, supra note 126.
129. Finley, supra note 126.
130. See supra note 126 (discussing Bender's utilization of the difference theory). Bender
extends this analysis to the important area of tort liability for a duty to rescue. Bender is, in effect,
utilizing the strategy of seeing women's qualities as superior to, and substituting for, men's (more
"'detached" negligence) in the formal legal standards.
131. See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L REV. 957 (1982); Radin, Market-
(In)Alienability, 100 HARV. L. REV 1849 (1987); Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from
Game Theory, Narrative Theory and Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMISM 37 (1990). See also
Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L REV. 421 (1992) (using game
theory to explore assumptions that women's "'taste for cooperation" results in their owning less
property).
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poignantly described in recounting the sale of her great-
grandmother into slavery, give women a "different perspective" on
what it means to own and be owned."' Feminists in family law
have contributed to expanded concepts of property in
reconceptualizing what must be divided at divorce including the
contributions and investments of wives in the "property" of their
husband's professional degrees and goodwill.
133
In contracts, Professors Dalton and Frug have deconstructed
the familiar doctrines of contract and their teaching to demonstrate
that presumed "neutrality" of rules in fact divides the world into
gendered categories of what may be enforced (commercial
promises) and what may not (domestic promises).1 3 1 More
recently Mary Joe Frug has demonstrated that any contract (or any
legal) doctrine can be subjected to a feminist analysis by
demonstrating the relationship of the interpreter to the text.135 She
argues that even a doctrine as "neutral" as the impossibility
doctrine permits ambiguous or dualistic readings that can be used
to cut off excuses in masculinist line drawing Draconian ways or
instead, can be used to permit flexible appeals to discretion and
mercy and forgiveness.
131
Most recently, several scholars have argued that feminist
sensibilities might affect the processes we bring to bear on solving
legal problems, again signaling the controversies and differences
among feminists.137 Are clear rules male and discretionarily
flexible rules female? Is law male and equity female? Is
132. Williams On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988). Here again we confront
differences among feminists who debate whether women ought to be allowed free trade in their
bodies as in prostitution. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 54, at 1052-59; PAToM, THE SEXUAL
CONTRACT (1988).
133. Blumberg, Intangible Marital Property, VALUATION AND DIsTRIBTiON o MARrrAL
PROPERTY (Matthew Bender 1984). See Blumberg, Identifying and Valuing Goodwill at Divorce, in
LAW AND CONmiPORARY PROBLEmS (1992). See, e.g., Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574
P.2d 75 (1978); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
134. Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L. 997 (1985).
See also Tidwell & Linzer, The Flesh-Colored BandAid-Contracts, FeminLmr, Dialogue and Norms,
28 HoUs. L. Rnv. 791 (1991).
135. Frug, supra note 109; Frug, supra note 111.
136. Frug, supra note 109.
137. Bartlett, supra note 121.
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adjudication male and alternative dispute resolution female? Is
reluctance to cut off relevancy or issue preclusion female? These
were procedural questions recently debated at the annual meeting
of law professors as feminist proceduralists explored the
contributions of feminism to legal process.13
Related to the issues of feminist process in the legal system and
more fully explored below are such controversial issues as whether
women lawyers will practice law differently from men, 139 now
complemented by the question of whether judges will make
different legal decision-makers based upon their gendered
experiences?1" If feminists engage the legal process in a gender
differentiated way, will they create particular forms of knowledge,
argumentation or legal method?141
This cursory review of the first round of feminist contributions
to legal theory on issues directly pertaining to women and the basic
core of legal thought is only partially suggestive of what feminist
theory can do. More recent work has begun to push the feminist
analysis into corners and cracks of the law that at first glance do
not appear to have direct applicability to women's issues. It is here
that feminist theory will be mainstreamed into all forms of legal
analysis.
138. See AALS Joint Session of Civil Procedure and Women In Legal Education, Judith
Resnik, Elizabeth Schneider, Barbara Babcock, Harold Koh, & Judge Shirley Abrahamson, San
Antonio Texas, Jan. 1992. See generally Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMi"NsM
189 (1991); Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum:
The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEao. ED. 243 (1988) (other efforts
to include feminist thinking in civil procedure).
139. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 55-58.
140. Resnik, supra note 90; Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and
Judging, 61 S. CALL REV. 1945 (1988).
141. Bartlett, supra note 121; Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron-A Study of the Briefs
Filed in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HAv. WoMEN's LJ. 137 (1991); Cahn,
Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S I4. 1 (1992).
1522
1992 / Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory
I. MAINSTREAMING FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
A. Constitutional Law
It seems fitting that one of the first attempts to mainstream
feminist theory came from one of my male colleagues, a
distinguished constitutional law scholar. In 1984, Ken Karst
associated himself with the "difference school" of female values
explored by Carol Gilligan to suggest that the Constitution and our
precious civil rights and liberties might be conceived of in
dichotomous values that echoed the gendered "ladder" (of
hierarchical thinking of Gilligan's Jake) or "web" (of Amy's
connected and relational thinking).142 This author and others have
suggested that classic constitutional concepts like liberty and
autonomy might be defined differently from a woman's
perspective. 43 For instance, Suzanna Sherry has controversially
suggested that Justice O'Connor has demonstrated a "feminine"
sensibility in constitutional decision-making. 1"
Utilizing yet another of the feminist theoretical strategies, Janet
Halley has demonstrated that the rubric of "immutable
characteristics" as a foundational claim for heightened scrutiny in
conventional equal protection analysis will not work with a
socially, as well as sexually, constructed concept of
homosexuality,14 brilliantly elaborating the problems of binary
categories in legal thinking. 46
142. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L . 447, 480-508 (1984).
143. Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, I YALE J.L &
FEMINISM 7 (1989). See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 62 (discussing Lassiter v. Dept of Soc.
Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), as not fully recognizing the right "not to be cut off from one's
children" as a liberty right).
144. Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REv. 543 (1986).
145. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection For Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989).
146. Elsewhere I have written of the law's seeming need to dichotomize and think in binary
categories, unlike other disciplines, because of the basic structures of the adversary system. See
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L REV. 754, 789 (1984). See also HINTIKKA AND HARDING, Adversary Thinking in
Philosophy, in DiScov uNo REALrrY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPisTEMOLOY, METAPHYSICs,
METoDoLooy, AND PHILOsoPHY op ScmNcE (1983). The complex arguments of causation in sex
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B. Doctrine Beyond the Core
More recent work by another generation of feminists has
expanded into new areas of inquiry. This work seeks not only to
refine and reframe feminist issues for and among feminists, but it
addresses areas of law, not obviously related to feminist or
women's concerns. Thus, it is an effort to mainstream feminist
legal theory, to show how women's experiences, conditions or
concerns can inform all aspects of law. Just as the "feminist"
takes on women's issues and core areas of law explored above,
these scholars demonstrate the same structural arguments about
feminist or women's inputs into law.
Building on her work in procedure and process, Cynthia Farina
has argued for a feminist approach to public administration and the
administrative state by suggesting, as have feminist tolitical
theorists before her, 47 that masculinist conceptions of the state
and its regulatory schemes assume a rationalist, individualist,
autonomous set of actors (an argument similar to Robin West's
characterization of male jurisprudence),' 48 especially among those
regulatory theorists who pattern their work on economic analyses
of "rational or economic man."' 49 Farina is interested in
exploring the relationship of the regulated to the state in reviewing
recent male attempts to grapple with the complexities of the
modem state. 5' Farina suggests that theorists, like MacKinnon
who have begun to explore a theory of the state and feminist
proceduralists focused on court processes, have begun to examine
discrimination in high commission jobs was dichotomized in the expert theories of "'discrimination"
vs. "'women's choice." See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10 at n.9. See also, Schultz, Telling Stories
About Women and Work. Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII
Cases Raising the Lack ofInterest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750 (1990); Milkman, Women's
History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMNIST STUDIS 375 (1986); Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-
Difference or the Uses of Post-Structuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUDIES 33 (1988).
147. Pateman, supra note 20; Okin, supra note 20.
148. WEST, supra note 54.
149. Farina, Getting From Here to There, 1991 DUKE LJ. 689 (1991).
150. Farina is reviewing Cass Sunstein's AFrER THE RIhTS REVOLUTlON: RECONCEIVINO THE
REGULATORY STATE (1990) and Chris Edley's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINXNo JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990), in Farina supra note 149.
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the nature of public law from a feminist perspective.1 5' Feminists
have deconstructed the public/private distinction and shown the
symbiotic relations of differential regulations in these spheres.
52
Indeed, Judith Resnik has attempted to show how public law
bounds itself by separating from the "housekeeping" functions it
regards as less important.'53 Several feminist scholars have taken
on explicitly the functions of the modern administrative state to
explore the responsibility of the government for individual welfare,
focusing upon the kind of "interdependence theory"' 54 of state
responsibility for individuals that builds on earlier work by political
scientist Kathy Ferguson.' 55 Whether in the process concerns of
Lucie White, who chronicles how individuals and oppressed groups
are left out of the administrative and public law discourse, 156 or
the substantive welfare policy concerns of such writers as Sylvia
Law,157  Mary Becker '5  or Johanna Brenner,159  such feminist
theorists explore some version of the connection thesis to argue
that feminist lawmakers would reconceptualize rules, institutions
and the relationship of these to people in a different way than the
traditional liberal social contractarians or even the civic republican
revivalists." Such theorists posit an "interactive, collaborative
decisional" structure for our institutions that in some sense reflects
old debates about discretion and rules, but recasts the dialogue in
151. Farina, supra note 149.
152. Olsen, supra note 94.
153. Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature andAllocation of Work in the Federal Trial Court, 24
GEORGIA L. REv. 909 (1990).
154. Farina, supra note 149, at 707.
155. FERGUSON, Mm FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY (1984).
156. White, supra note 117.
157. Law, supra note 117.
158. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 169 (1989).
159. Brenner, Towards A Feminist Perspective on Welfare Reform, 2 YALE J. oF L & FEM.
99 (1989). Brenner argues that a feminist welfare policy has to focus on the welfare mothers job and
employment possibilities, not on a romantic defense of the family (as urged by some feminists) in
order to prevent dependency. Id. Brenner thus takes on some of the complex equality-difference
issues in the particular context of welfare policy. In welfare policy this is a particularly tricky
endeavor, because not only does it reveal the cleavages of feminist theorists in several disciplines,
but it also aligns some feminists on the side of what appear to be conservative political policies
requiring some forms of workfare.
160. See Michelman, supra note 90.
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a more open-ended fashion by linking it to particular contexts,
rather than trying to justify a global or meta-theoretical defense for
discretion on a systemic level.'61 As Farina points out, feminists
have been concerned with the uses of power from having
experienced, at first hand, the often arbitrary use of state
power.162 Feminists, in Farina's work, have looked at power
"from both sides now--from win and lose," '63 where women
have been the object or victim of both male and statist power, but
have also exercised a different form of power, that of the caretaker,
nurturer, and empowerer.' 64 Thus, women may reconstruct our
conceptions of power and governmental authority, as feminists have
now tried to reconstruct other core concepts in our
jurisprudence 65
In a somewhat related manner, some feminist theorists have
begun to explore the exercise of private power in the corporate
setting in similar ways. For instance, arguing that women might
organize the workplace differently, it has been suggested that
different forms of ownership and control might obtain with a
feminist corporatism."6 Building on the work of sociologist
Rosabeth Kanter,167  Lahey and Salter recognize that
organizational structures are necessary sites of social change and
161. See Edley, supra note 150.
162. Farina, supra note 149.
163. Apologies to Judy Collins, "Both Sides Now, " Colors of the Sky (1966).
164. Farina, supra note 149, at 709.
165. The best example I can think of here is Jennifer Nedelsky's work on autonomy. See
Nedelsky, supra note 143. I have urged feminist reconstructions of other key legal concepts like
"liberty." See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 62. See also Karst, supra note 142 (urging feminist
reconstructions of several constitutional principles). There is virtually no limit to the key legal
concepts feminist legal theorists could choose to explore in the reconstruction and reconceptualization
project.
166. See Lahey & Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From
Classicism to Feminism, 23 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 543 (1985). Lahey and Salter look briefly at the
alternative feminist organizations that were created during the heyday of the second wave of the
women's movement involving modes of participation, democratic governance, nonelitism and
antihierarchy. Id. Many of these institutions have failed or gone on to more conventional forms
(worker cooperatives and employee ownership are some non-feminist examples), but they still serve
as evocative countermodels. See also A. PluaLes, FrEoNDmwNo DEtocRLcY (1991) (describing
feminist democratic organizations).
167. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
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are greatly responsible for molding individual behavior and
choices.168 Like others who explore decision-making in the
private and public sphere, Lahey and Salter implicitly identify
themselves with a woman's "difference" model by suggesting that
women will be more concerned with self-governance and the
effects of corporate decisions on others, beyond the mere monetary
concerns of the "bottom line." 1 69 In a different but related
context, Regina Austin has explored how oppressed workers, both
women and racial minorities have exercised some control over their
work by resisting managerial policies that attempt to control
workers by subordinating them,17 and by creating alternative
work cultures and internal rules of self-management.17" ' In
Austin's analysis, women (and people of color) develop alternative
cultural constructions of work, not necessarily from the
"Gilliganesque care" perspectives, but from resistance to
oppressive conditions. Thus, difference can be expressed in the
Janus-face of care, and anger as resistance. As MacKinnon points
out, structurally these may produce the same result since both care
for and resistance to the oppressor lead to reactions to the
oppressor, rather than the creation of something totally new.'72
Thus, feminists who really seek to explore other forms of
ownership and control must begin to examine what alternative
models exist that are not built totally from reactions to masculinist
structures and conceptions.
Addressing this challenge in a related area, Marion Crain has
recently argued that feminizing unions is one way to meet head-on
168. Lahey & Salter, supra note 166.
169. Id. at 569.
170. Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988).
171. Austin's work relies heavily upon the empirical work of feminist anthropologists and
sociologists who have studied feminist workplace behavior. See, e.g., SACKS, CARING BY THE HOUR:
WOMEN, WORK AND ORGANIZINo AT DUKE MEDIcAL CENTER (1988); SACKS & REMY, MY
TROUBLES ARE GOING TO HAVE TROUBLE WITH ME (1984); WESTWOOD, ALL DAY, EVERY DAY
(1984); Rou.INs, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTics AND THE EMPI.OYERS (1985).
172. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, in DFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE (1984). See
MacKinnon, Comments, in DUBOis, supra note 83.
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the gendered system of wage labor. 73 Adopting yet another
version of the "difference" theory, Crain suggests that the growing
numeric strength of women in the workforce could be tapped to
have women begin to exercise control in labor unions by
demonstrating "new ideas about how unions should be structured,"
to exert economic power and democratic decision-making. Women
collectively organized, for example, might make child care, parental
leave, medical insurance and other "social" and affilial benefits
more significant than they are now. 74 (Might women value some
of these things more than pure economic wages, such as having
child care close to work?) 75 If women are notable for their
"care" for others, why isn't that expressed as care for others in the
workplace, just like care at home? 76 If women are more likely
to be self-sacrificing'77 then they should be naturals for the
collective action of unions in which all work is for the greatest
good for the greatest number. 78 Crain goes even further to
suggest a "deconstruction" of labor law, as Frug has deconstructed
contract law and others are deconstructing other areas.179 She
demonstrates the strategy of masculinist assumptions in the law,
including definitions of "worker" as male, breadwinner with need
for a family wage, the exclusion of confidential workers and
173. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH.
I REV. 1155 (1991). See Conaghan, The Invisibility of Women in Labor Law: Gender Neutrality in
Model-Building, 14 IT'L. J. SOC. L. 377 (1986) (discussing how basic labor concepts are developed
from male, and not female, labor experiences).
174. Crain, supra note 173, at 1156.
175. Crain notes for example that where women have been in leadership positions in unions
these issues moved to the fore of the organized activity. See Crain, supra note 173, at 1180-81
(discussing the Harvard and Yale labor strikes).
176. Crain attributes this classic misinterpretation of women's care at the workplace to the
strength of the publiclprivate split which sees women as caring only at home, while feminist scholars
of women in the workplace have demonstrated that care does not stop at home. See, e.g., Sacks,
supra note 171; Milkman, supra note 146.
177. This is one of the most controversial aspects of Gilligan's ethic of care. See ALLEN,
UNEAsY AccEss; WoMEN's PRIVACY (1988).
178. Both Crain and Vicki Schultz do an outstanding job of deconstructing the lay and
scholarly myths about women's inability to organize or choose particular types of jobs. See Crain
supra note 174; Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARv.
L. REv. 1749 (1990).
179. See, e.g., Frug, supra notes 109, 111; Dalton, supra note 134.
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independent contractors from labor laws that just coincidentally
happen to be jobs principally held by women; no-solicitation rules
that limit where workers, who are busy mothers, may learn about
unionization, work actions prohibited that may be more likely to be
engaged in by women (like slow-downs) and arbitrary divisions of
mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects that just happen to
divide traditional wage and hour issues from more women's
interest work benefits.' Crain urges that feminist scholars
deconstruct labor law to unmask the masculinist assumptions which
have informed the legal categories that comprise American labor
law.18 1
Almost as if she heard Crain's clarion call, Lea Vandervelde
has recently deconstructed one rule of contract and labor law--the
Lumley rule, limiting specific performance, but enjoining certain
employees from plying their trade elsewhere.18 2 Vandervelde
engages us in a historical tour de force by demonstrating the
gendered origins of a seemingly neutral rule. Given that the rule
was developed and elaborated upon in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century cases dealing with female entertainers,
Vandervelde demonstrates that the particular gendered context in
which these cases were litigated enacted a gendered conception of
female subordination to male managers, thus creating legal
principles that were later applied in a more neutral, but still
oppressive fashion, to men.'83 By uncovering the historical
circumstances of how our neutral rules came to be, Vandervelde
explores another dimension of feminist scholarship that could easily
inform all areas of law.' We must ask how often are the neutral
180. Crain, supra note 173, at 1214-19.
181. Id at 1214.
182. Vandervelde, supra note 112, at 775.
183. Id. at 834.
184. Many other social historians have begun to engage in this kind of historical deconstructive
work to demonstrate that our "'neutral" rules seldom have neutral contexts as they are developed.
See, e.g., Minow, Forming Underneath Everything that Grows: Toward A History of Family Law,
1985 Wis. L REv. 819 (1985); FzmmAN, ILLusioNs oF EuALrrY (1990); HARTOG, PuBLic
PROPERTY AND PR1VATE PowER: THE CORPORATION oF THE CTEs oF NEw YoRK IN AMERICAN
LAw (1983); FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPINo OF TEM AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991).
1529
Pacific Law Journal!Vol. 23
rules we are in thrall to the product of gendered parties and sexist
assumptions of social and legal relations." 5
Even in areas as seemingly remote as commercial and tax law,
feminist scholars have recently explored how feminist perspectives
might inform new readings of laws or affect policy justifications.
In reviewing the empirical bankruptcy work of Teresa Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook,'86 Karen Gross has recently
argued that attention to who comprises individual bankrupt debtors
in our society, informed by "women's different values," might
recast some of our priorities in bankruptcy." 7 If women are a
large percentage of the debtors and the poor in America,
alternatively formulated as "the povertization of women" or the
"feminization of poverty," ' we may need to uncover the
different routes by which women become debtors, either as single
women or as the "passive" bystander of spousal consumption
patterns, and the different attitudes that women may have about
invoking particular aspects of the bankruptcy law."8 9 Gross
explicitly employs the Gilligan-difference approach to suggest that
some women may adopt a different moral stance with respect to
past debts. 9  Bankruptcy law, she suggests, is
"phallocentric."''" Gross suggests that a different, more
mediational approach might occur in bankruptcy court, if not only
women as debtors, but women as bankruptcy judges, were taken
more seriously."9 Like Crain, Gross engages in gendered
deconstructive readings of particular provisions of the bankruptcy
185. Frug, supra notes 110, 112; Finley, supra note 125.
186. Suu.IVAN, WARuN, & WEsTRooy, As WE FORGIVE Ou. DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989).
137. Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 MmcH.
L. REv. 1506 (1990).
188. Id. Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, URB. & Soc.
CHANGE REV. 28-36 (Winter-Spring 1978).
189. Gross suggests, for example, that women may be less likely to want a clean break under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "screw you approach"), but might prefer the reorganization
plan, under Chapter 13, that allows them to reaffirm and take responsibility for their debts, especially
if they are trying to reestablish their own credit after an unsuccessful relationship with a man. Gross,
supra note 187, at 1538.
190. Id. at 1541.
191. Id. at 1533.
192. Id. at 1544.
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code to elaborate how a feminist sensibility or at least attention to
the empirical differences of female debtors might inform the
drafting and "re-visioning" of particular bankruptcy
provisions.193
Operating on a more global policy level, Marjorie Kornhauser
suggests that feminism may offer a justification for progressivity
in our tax system. 94 After canvassing the more classic defenses
of and justifications for progressivity in our tax system, based
upon law and economics analysis, Kornhauser suggests that a
feminine - "Gilliganesque" difference model of care and
connection can be used to provide an "alternative" philosophic
vision of our tax system, based on our interdependence and sense
of responsibility for each other.195 She argues that people with
enough money to live on can "care for others" by providing a
share of their own income to provide an equitable redistribution of
wealth.1 96 Kornhauser further applies her feminist analysis within
the suggestions of recent efforts to look more closely at self-
interest and altruism as motives within our public actions.1 97
Other feminists have explored various strategies of analysis to
demonstrate that the effects of "neutral" tax laws operate to
penalize women, based upon the particularities of their working and
family patterns, which do not necessarily conform to traditional
male patterns of earnings and family life.19
193. Id. at 1542-53.
194. Komhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male
Reaction, 86 MicH. L. REV. 465 (1987). See Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several
Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L RE'. 317 (1990) (applying more
traditional feminist analysis to the tax area). In more traditional analysis, marital statutes and the use
of the family as the taxable unit have long been part of the conventional tax policy analysis.
Similarly, the gendered aspects of other government programs like Social Security and welfare have
recently been subjected to feminist analysis. See Blumberg, supra note 116 (Social Security); Law,
supra note 117 (welfare).
195. Kornhauser, supra note 194, at 507-08.
196. Id at 511.
197. See iUL at 505,513. See also J. MANSBRDGE, BEYoND SELF-INTEREsT (1990); Henderson,
Empathy and Legality, 85 MICl. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in
Lawyering?, 8 GEO. ST. L. REv. 385 (1992) (explaining some of the author's thoughts on this
subject); Rose, supra note 131.
198. See, e.g., Maloney, Women and the Income Tax Act: Marriage Motherhood and Divorce,
3 CANADIAN L OF WOMEN'S & L 182 (1989).
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Extending the analysis of our responsibility for others still
further, a variety of feminist theorists in international law have
applied feminist analyses to the international law arena. Again,
focusing upon a structural argument that claims difference on
behalf of women, some analysts decry the absence of women from
international law positions that minimize their impact on
international law, resulting in the kinds of silences and absences
about women's issues that characterize our study of domestic law
as well.199 For example, international human rights treaties and
laws typically fail to mention or fail to enforce a myriad of
provisions that inhibit women from taking part in the political life
of our global world, replicating the public/private distinctions
which seem to inhere in all legal systems. This is evidenced by the
treatment of such issues as genital mutilation,' 0 domestic
physical abuse not recognized as torture, 20 1 coercive contraception
or population control practices, regulation or treatment of
international or diplomatic prostitution, mail order bride practices
and international rings of pornography and other sexual abuse.
2 2
While disputes in the international arena about how to evaluate
sexist and gendered conduct implicates cultural practices 2 3 that
may vary and be subject to even more dissensus than domestic
feminism, feminist international law scholars inform us that we can
examine these important issues through a deconstruction of the
individual rights schemes that inform much of international
law.' Like other feminists, international law scholars also
suggest that women in the international arena may be more likely
199. Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J.
INI'L. LAW 615 (1991); Engle, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the
Exotic Other Female, NEW. ENO. L. REV. (forthcoming edition).
200. Gunning, Arrogant Perceptions, World-Traveling and Multicultural Feminism: The Care
of Female Genital Surgeries (manuscript on file with author); Bouleware-Miller, Female,
Circumcision: Challenges to the Practice asA Human Rights Violation, 8 HARv. WOME'S L. J. 155
(1985); Cranfield and Cranfield, Female Circumcision: An Assault, 227 Practitioner 816 (1983);
Engle, supra note 199.
201. Charlesworth, supra note 199, at 627.
202. Id. at 630.
203. See Gunning, supra note 200; Engle, supra note 199 (discussing the tensions between
feminism and cultural relativism or its new formulation, multiculturalism).
204. Gunning, supra note 200; Engle, supra note 199.
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to employ consensual, conciliatory processes than the adversarial
processes that characterize much international law-making and
practice.' These scholars point out that a body of law which
takes "self-determination" as its primary ideological justification
has largely excluded more than one-half of the world's
population. 2'6 Feminists working in international law and human
rights also critique the "Eurocentrism" of western feminism as
applied to third world women.
These illustrations of feminist theory applied to particular areas
of law are partial and incomplete. They are intended to illustrate
and evoke the kinds of arguments that feminist theorists are making
about law and lawmakers. Implicitly, they argue that if more
women were admitted to the process of making, interpreting and
enforcing law, perhaps interacting with and translating with male
colleagues, a greater variety of values would be expressed in the
law and whole bodies of law might change or have their
underpinnings questioned. Since I have been among those arguing
that more women in the legal profession will change the way law
is made and practiced," 7 we can see the work of the feminist
academics discussed above have already affected the ways in which
we think about law and legal phenomena. Women have moved
from being "victims" of, or the "acted upon" in law, to begin to
assert their own understandings and reconceptualizations of law.
IV. FEMINIST THEORY INTo DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE
Some of these feminist analyses of law have already made their
mark on doctrine as illustrated by the few examples already
referred to above. Catherine MacKinnon has forged her theoretical
approaches to women's inequality in law through efforts in specific
legal reforms including sexual harassment conceived as gender
205. Charlesworth, supra note 199, at 616.
206. rd.
207. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 55 and note 107.
1533
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 23
discrimination2 °8 and pornography as an actionable civil rights
violation," 9 utilizing both statutory and common law strategies.
MacKinnon's efforts have created new laws where once there were
none.
2 10
Other feminists have won traditional equality rights for women
based upon new or reconstructed arguments. Chris Littleton's
successful argument about the relationship of work to procreational
equality is one example of this progress."
Other feminist strategists have redefined legal standards to
expand women's needs, interests and rights within the legal system,
as in the development of rape shield laws, reconceptualizations of
consent in rape defense212 and the adoption of a "reasonable
woman" standard in sexual harassment cases.213
Further, both black feminist and lesbian feminists have pointed
out that generic categorizations of "woman" fail to account for
their particular needs and interests from the legal system. 14 Thus,
the constitution and statutes that attempt to remedy discrimination
require more specific formulations to deal with the particulars of
black women's experience 1 5 and the particularities of the ways
in which gays and lesbians are oppressed, subordinated and
discriminated against in our society.216
208. MacKinnon, supra note 43; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 447 U.S. 57 (1986). Several
feminist scholars have now also tried to reclaim sexual harassment as a tort. See Chamallas, supra
note 88.
209. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985);
MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L & POL'Y REv. 321 (1984).
210. Even though these laws haven't always been sustained legally; they have provided
organizing devices for women. See Hudnut v. American Booksellers, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See also
supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
213. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co,, 805 F.2d.
611 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying a 'reasonable woman" standard).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
215. See Crenshaw, supra note 51; Harris, supra note 51; Scales-Trent, supra note 96
(discussing the black woman's experience in this context).
216. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding sodomy law constitutional);
Halley, supra note 146; Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation ofthe Armed Forces,
38 UCLA. L. REV. 499 (1991); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Associations, 89 YALE L. J. 624
(1980) (discussing constitutional bases for non-intervention in personal and intimate relations). See
also Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L REV. 187 (1988).
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Other feminists have focused upon the process or practice of
law to accomplish feminist ends, either by using law and legal
battles such as reproductive rights 17 and pornography2 8 to
organize women politically for substantive legal battles or to
attempt to transform legal process itself through feminist
practices.219
I have argued that some of the concerns associated with
women's socially constructed interdependence on and for others
may facilitate a concern for the other that might both transform the
ways in which women practice law22 and more broadly cause us
to deconstruct and reconstruct the binary oppositions of our
adversary system that cause us to see the other as someone to be
defeated, rather than helped.221 Although there has been some
empirical support for these claims,2 22 there has been vigorous
objection to the notion that women have distinctive styles of
lawyering 22" or that particular processes such as mediation,
conciliation or ADR generally are particularly feminist.
224
Rigorous analysis has shown, and will continue to show, that
women operate within social structures that may inhibit whatever
differences they may bring to the world: the economics of big and
217. See, e.g., Taub, Reproductive Rights, in WOMEN AND THE LAW (2nd ed. 1987); Schneider,
supra note 8.
218. With Catherine MacKinnon and Andra Dworkin on one side, see supra note 82, and
Sylvia Law and the FACT brief on other, see supra notes 47 and 85.
219. See Menkel-Meadowsupra note 7, at55; Abrams, FeministLawyeringandLegalMethod,
16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 373 (1991).
220. Menkel-Meadowsupra note 8, at 55; Menkel-Meadow, Comparative Sociology of Women
Lawyers: The Feminization of the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS AND SOCIErY, vol. 3 (1990).
221. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 54
(1984); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 197.
222. JACK AND JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES
oF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989); Symposium on Women in the Lawyering Workplace:
Feminist Considerations and Practical Solutions, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 293 (1990). See Symposium
on Gender and Legal Ethics, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 1-208 (1990).
223. Cahn, Male and Female Styles of Lawyering (forthcoming publication in HASTINGS L. R.);
Epstein, Faulty Framework: Consequences of the Difference Modelfor Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L.
REV. 309 (1990).
224. See, e.g., Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ.
1545 (1991); AALS SESSION ON WOMEN AND CIVIL PROCEDURE (1992).
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small practice; the pressures to conform to the usual way in
which business is transacted; 6 and the never ending conflicts
between professional work and family life. 7
The women lawyers who are working on transforming law
include the academic women lawyers who have written the articles
and books and worked on the lawsuits described herein.
Transformation has been and will probably continue to be slow, but
feminist theorists are making some mark on how we understand
law, legal knowledge and legal doctrine.
V. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND THE PRODUCTION AND
TRANSMISSION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE
The final pages of this Article will focus upon some of the
ways legal education and legal knowledge are being transformed by
feminist theory and feminist work, and suggest some of my hopes
and fears about this project.
A. Legal Education
Tracking some of the structured arguments discussed above, a
variety of feminist scholars and teachers have analyzed the process
of legal education itself as maleP' in its modeling of
competitiveness, individualism, adversariness in opposition to
shared learning, nurturance, or as I have previously described it,
225. Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal
Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 289 (1989); SERON,
MIDDLE CLASS LAWYERS (forthcoming).
226. Maiman, Mather & McEwen, Gender and Specialization: Differences Among Lawyers
(paper presented to 1991 American Political Science Association, Washington D.C. 1991).
227. See Frug, Securing Job Equalityfor Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers,
59 B.U.L REv. 55 (1979); Dowd, supra note 93. In recent years I have tempered my own claims
about how women will transform the legal profession by realizing that women who still devote more
time to both spheres may simply be too tired to work on transformative efforts in the workplace,
thereby relinquishing the power to the traditionally work-committed males (those who are most likely
to preserve the status quo of work). See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 225; A. HOCHSCi.D, THE
SECOD SHIFr (1991).
228. I like to think of myself as one of the pioneers in this area. See Menkel-Meadow, Women
as Law Teachers: Toward The Feminization of Legal Education, in HUMANisiIC EDUCATION IN LAW
31(1981).
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"rigor" with "warmth." In a special issue of the Journal of Legal
Education, both the failings of traditional legal education and the
possibilities for change were explored by feminists who explored
how less hierarchical classrooms with more shared learning might
transform the process as well as the content of learning."
Feminist teachers have explored the relation of the personal to the
legal,23° the social context of cases and legal principles,23' uses
of more participatory teaching methods, like consciousness raising
and the use of real cases to teach about real people's legal
problems.' 2 Feminist students have explored the broader context
of first year legal education, amassing their own texts to study
from233 and their own stories for telling.' These approaches,
aimed at opening up legal education, are not without their
difficulties. In yet another recent memoir about legal education at
Harvard Law School, Richard Kahlenberg misogynistically
criticizes a "more humane, contextualized" class taught by Martha
Minow because, as he argues, to be gotten the better of by a
woman and compassionate teacher is so much more humiliating
than a classic Socratic put-down by a traditional hard male teacher
like Arthur Miller." The openness of the feminist classroom has
led other groups to demand their place in the experience of legal
education, particularly ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, yet all
229. Women in Legal Education-Pedagology, Law, Theory & Practice, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 1, 1-
270 (Menkel-Meadows, Minow, Vernon eds.) (1988).
230. See, e.g., Freedman, Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism Sexism and
Homophobia in Law School, 24 GA. L. R V. 849 (1990); Torrey, Casey & Olson, Teaching Law in
a Feminist Manner: A Commentary from Experience, 13 HA~v. WoMEN's L. J. 87 (1990).
231. Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. Cin. LEG. FORUM 115 (1989); Menkel-Meadow,
Two Contradictory Criticisms of Clinical Education: Dilemmas and Directions in Lawyering
Education, 4 ANTIOCH LJ. 287 (1986); Cain, Teaching Feminist Theory at Texas: Listening to
Difference and Exploring Connections, 38 J. L AL ED 165 (1988).
232. Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Clinical Teaching, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1599 (1991), Eyster, Analysis of Sexism in Legal Practice: A Clinical Approach, 38 J. LEGAL ED.
183 (1988).
233. Stanford Law Students, Beyond the Casebook: A Supplementary Readerfor First Semester
Stanford Law Students (1990); Part One: Civil Procedure, Contracts & Cross Cutting Issues (1990)
(copy on file with author).
234. Weiss & Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988)
(discussing the experiences of female Yale law students).
235. KAm.ENBERG, BROKEN CoNMRACr 3 (1991).
1537
Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 23
of this has occurred as others attack the "political correctness
' 236
they claim is required in law school classes where some try to give
voice to the previously silenced.237  In their attempts to
reconstruct the law school classroom and legal education, feminist
legal educators and scholars have attempted to specify how their
method and theories of knowledge have broadened the ambit of
traditional legal education.
B. Legal Knowledge
Moving from claims of differences in learning styles, such as
contextualized connected learning" based on experience,
feminist legal scholars exploring the question of whether there is
anything distinctive about a feminist method have concluded that
like other twentieth century antipositivist movements,23 9 feminists
recognize the partiality and positionality of all knowledge.24 ' Law
is no longer only man-made, and it is certainly no longer
interpreted only by men. But at the same time, feminist theorists
have moved away from essentialist oppositionalism to recognize
the multiplicities of perspectives from which law must be
understood. For example, Patricia Williams, the great-
granddaughter of a slave raped by a white male lawyer master,
explored how the law looks from the perspective of the hunted fox
in Pierson v. Post241 and several polar bears in a zoo.242 In her
words, "subject position is everything in... law." 243 Though I
remain partial to the view that the oppressed and suppressed have
the ability to see more because of their need to master the language
236. Federalist Society Symposia, Tim DocKr (UCLA Student Newspaper Debating P.C.) (P.
Berman ed., 1992) (debating political correctness).
237. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 .
LEO. ED. 147 (1988); Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 3. LEo. ED 137 (1988).
238. See BELENKY ELr. AL, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING (1986).
239. BERER & LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCrION OF REALITY (1966).
240. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Method, 103 HARv. L REv. 829, 880 (1990); Minow, Justice
Engendered, 101 HARv. L REV. 10 (1987).
241. 3 Cai. R 175 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1805).
242. WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE Am RiaHs 202 (1990).
243. Id. at 3.
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of the oppressor as well as their own, such "standpoint"
epistemologies244 are no longer in such favor as we realize that
power relations structure all of our ways of knowing and seeing,
from both sides of any particular power divide.245 Yet in its legal
form, feminist and critical race scholars point us to ways in which
"outsider jurisprudence" 246 informs us about law by telling us
what it is like to be acted upon by law, rather than by being the
makers and enforcers. This claim has met its opposition in the
vigorous debate about racial and gender essentialist epistemology
begun by Randall Kennedy, Steve Carter and others (why are there
only males on that side of the argument?).247
There are particular contributions to legal knowledge that are
derived from feminist concerns ranging from the use of narrative,
storytelling and interpretation, 248 to increasing analysis of the
empathetic, caring, helping side of law.249 Also included are the
deconstruction of binary oppositions and critiques of the adversary
system and the harshness of law, 2 0 as well as post-modernist
skepticism about global truths or metanarratives" 1 that can be
told about law. All of these insights, though shared with other
twentieth century assaults on the rationalist Enlightenment project,
244. HARDING, WHOSE KNOWLEDE WHOSE SCIENCE? 119 (1991).
245. ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrIcs (1975); JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING
(1972).
246. The phrase is Mari Matsuda's. See Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L RPm. 7 (1989).
247. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of LegalAcademia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989); CARTER,
REFLEcTrONS OF AN AFFIATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); Johnson, The New Voice of Color, 100
YALE LJ. 2007 (1991); Johnson, 24 Racial Critiques of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor of
Context, 43 STAN. L. REV. 137 (1990).
248. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. (1985); Radin, The
Feminist and the Pragmatist, 63 S. CAL. L REv. 1699 (1990); Cohen, Feminism and Adaptive
Heroinism: The Paradigm of Portia as a Means of Introduction, 25 TULSA L. REv. 657 (1990). There
is some danger that with the narrative turn, the articulate will be privileged. See White, supra note
156.
249. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L Rev. 1574 (1987); Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 197 (altruism).
250. My new favorite example of this is the feminist reconsideration of finality rules in civil
procedure. AALS SESSION PANEL ON WowMN IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND CIVIL PROCEDURE (Jan.
1992).
251. Rosenau, supra note 54, at xiii.
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come in part from allowing groups of people previously excluded,
that do not necessarily share the same social contractual stories of
consensus, into the study and practice of law.
VI. Is MAINSTREAMING POSSmLE OR DESIRABLE?
The question of whether feminists have or will have any real
influence upon the development of law -- either from a substantive
or a procedural perspective -- remains. It is essential for feminist
legal thought to be taken seriously, as some mainstream scholars
have done, 2 to explore the limits of our understandings of law
as currently constructed and as it could be.
I continue to have some concerns about how this mainstreaming
is currently occurring. Scholars of all genders and persuasions must
engage with each other. As multiple cultures in law, as in society,
we must find ways to translate our languages to each other.253
We must examine the hardest points of contention; where we use
competing metaphors of war/sport with care giving, food
preparation and nurturance, 2 4 oppositional understandings of the
same concept such as "consent" in rape, the harms caused by
things that some people enjoy (pornography, sexual
harassment)2" and the redefinition of old concepts to make them
capacious enough for us all to appreciate." We must also
252. See Michaelman, supra note 90; Karst, supra note 144; Sunstein, supra note 90;
SHMRIFF , FIRST AMENDMENT & DEMOCRACY (1990); Arenella, supra note 81; Schulfhofer, supra
note 81; Patterson, supra note 53 & Brest, supra note 82. Not all of these support particular feminist
projects or readings of law-some have disagreed vigorously with various feminist claims (such as
the battered spouse syndrome defense), but all have at least grappled seriously with feminist ideas.
253. DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION
(1990), controversially explores differences in male and female conversational patterns. The *'PC"
movement threatens to inhibit what my old friend, Howard Lesnick, has labeled "collective
grappling" with difficult problems.
254. There are thousands of deconstructive projects available to study the metaphors of law,
legal scholarship and legal practice.
255. This is what Robin West has labeled the gender differences in our hedonic lives. See West
supra note 118.
256. Here my favorite recent example is advice in a sex column of a woman's magazine that
men should stop calling it "foreplay," which is a male definition of sex, leading up to the main
event of intercourse. As the male author states, intercourse and genital orgasm are "optional" not
required aspects of sex. 20 Ways to Improve Your Sex Life, NEw WOMAN.
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explore scary subjects like the fear of true meritocracy that some
in power possess. Equality is the touchstone that everyone can
approve, but when "equality" leads some women or ethnic
minorities to be superior to white males, ugly sexism or racism
returns to mask the actual class fear that is occurring.
Finally, lest appearing to blame men for all of the problems in
the mainstreaming project, let me suggest that while separatism has
its place," 7  the growing proliferation of women's law
journals, 8 though expanding the number of pages in which
feminist legal theory and practice may develop, may inhibit the
conversation by allowing malestream scholars to avoid grappling
with this important work."
If feminism is to make its mark on laws and the larger social
contexts in which law is experienced, then we must find ways for
human conversation and translation to create a joint gendered legal
culture that more fully represents the world it seeks to regulate.
This Article began by saying that feminism is ultimately a
humanist project. We must find ways to facilitate that human
mutual understanding and knowledge that comes from
understanding the world beyond the one that each of us
comfortably inhabits on our own. It is you, the readers of this
Article, who will do the research, bring the cases and develop the
257. See several studies on girl students in single-sex schools, Shortchanging Girls,
ShortchangingAmerica (American Association of University Women 1991); Rhode, Association and
Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L Rnv. 106 (1987); Freedman, Separatism as a Strategy: Female Institution
Building and American Feminism, 5 FEMINiST STUDIES 512 (1979).
258. There are separate law journals now being published at many law schools, including
Harvard, Rutgers, Yale, Columbia, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Berkeley, UCLA, USC, American, Golden
Gate (special issues), Stanford (broader, including race and sexual orientation), and Texas.
259. It is ironic to note here that in preparing this article, I note that the Michigan Law Review
has published more articles about women's issues cited herein than any other single law review-all
of this at a school that until recently (with the hire of Catherine MacKinnon) was not known for its
feminist presence in theory making.
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theories of law for the new century. We will explain more of the
world if we include more diversified researchers, practitioners,
teachers and knowers, but only if they know how to talk to each
other.2 °
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260. For my views on how this might look in the larger field of socio-legal studies, see
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 234. See HARDnO, WHOSE SCIENC, WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?
(1991) (other efforts to deal with these issues in broader philosophical contexts); A. JARDIN & S.
HEATH, MEN IN FEMINISM (1987).
